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342 Almost on the same day there were two different events related to organised crime. 
On 7 April 2015 at the Bajakovo border crossing between Serbia and Croatia more 
than 140 kilograms of heroin was seized by the Croatian police. The drugs were 
hidden in the double bottom of a car driven by a 46-year-old citizen of Turkey, 
while in the passenger seat was a 26-year-old German citizen of Turkish origin. 
The market value of the seized drugs is estimated at more than HRK 42 million or 
5.5 million euros.
A few days earlier, the Centre for the Study of Democracy from Sofia published a 
comprehensive and interesting book entitled Financing of Organised Crime1. Its 
editors are Michael Levi, Ognian Shentov and Boyko Todorov. Organised crimi-
nals need significant financial resources to start their business, to launch new 
products or cover new areas; to meet periodic financial needs, to cover any inci-
dental or regular expenses and/or to support the potential vertical or horizontal 
expansion of their enterprise. 
Various researches have shown that financiers are often behind the funding of 
large-scale trafficking of commodities like cigarettes or drugs. Although they have 
an important role in the whole business, financiers mostly remain outside the in-
terest of analysis of organised crime at EU level and such information is largely 
omitted. Usually, legal enterprises secure external capital through borrowing, eq-
uity financing, or reinvestment of past internal profits. This raises the question 
about whether such possibilities also exist in illegal markets. Are there black mar-
ket banks and investors? And, if this is the case, how do they differ from their legal 
counterparts?
The many authors in the book analyse three forms of organised crime: the illegal 
market of cocaine, the illegal market of a tobacco products and VAT fraud. The 
aim of the study is to examine the sources, mechanisms and approaches behind the 
financing of organised crime, through collecting and analysing empirical data in 
order to enable more effective investigations of organised crime and money laun-
dering. Furthermore, the report also tries to scrutinise the possible interlocking 
relations between criminal structures and businesses and legitimate financial insti-
tutions; to examine cash flows in criminal enterprises and the costs and profits of 
doing illegal business. 
The methodological approach of the study presented in the report includes a broad 
collection and use of a multiple set of both secondary and primary data. The data 
collection for the study was based on four key elements: published literature (dif-
ferent reports by academics, institutes, governments, law enforcement reports by 
EUROPOL, INTERPOL, National Crime; media sources in many EU member 
states; survey and follow-up interviews with law-enforcement, judicial, and other 
government officials; and case studies were performed for Belgium, Bulgaria, 
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343Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Greece, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom. Each research partner – University of Trento, Italy; Teesside Universi-
ty, UK; and the Centre for the Study of Democracy, Bulgaria – was responsible for 
covering 9 EU member states and identifying potential respondents through their 
informal networks and official communications with the relevant governmental 
and law enforcement institutions.
From the various authority bodies in each EU member state, 8-10 persons were 
asked to take part in written interviews. They were officers in the police, financial 
police, border control, tax and customs authorities and officials from public pros-
ecutors or organisations responsible for the fight against organised crime. Around 
one third of the persons invited returned their completed interviews. The second 
step of the data collection was to make further telephone interviews the goal of 
which was to enhance and broaden the information collected via the survey. The 
respondents were asked to explain and elaborate on the details provided and to 
illustrate the evidence with experiences from their practice. Of the 83 participants 
who returned the questionnaire, approximately 23% agreed to give fuller accounts 
in a more detail interview. 
In 10 countries (Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Greece, It-
aly, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) more detailed researches were car-
ried out in at least one of the selected markets. These countries and the specific 
markets were determined by the initial stages of the research according to evi-
dence from the literature review, statistical data and the availability of locally-
based researchers. In-depth interviews were accomplished with country officials 
and other knowledgeable actors such as investigative journalists and business 
people, as well as criminal entrepreneurs. In-depth interviews with 225 partici-
pants were conducted in all 10 countries. Active criminal entrepreneurs were often 
identified from previous work in the field of organised crime and on some occa-
sions these criminal entrepreneurs introduced acquaintances or collaborators to 
the researchers.
As the cocaine market is central to the global drug problem, after these introduc-
tory remarks and explanation of the methodology, the first chapter is dedicated to 
cocaine trafficking in Europe. Most data show that on a whole, this market is on 
the decline. Cocaine entering Europe is smuggled often by sea using container 
shipments, or through transport by air or postal services, as well as by using drug 
couriers (i.e. swallowers). Besides the more traditional entry points of cocaine 
into Western and Central Europe (primarily Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands and 
Belgium, which are countries for the further distribution of cocaine), the Black 
Sea area and the Balkans are more and more involved in the diversification of 
cocaine trafficking routes. A key entry point for cocaine directed to South-Eastern 
Europe is Greece, which has recorded some of the largest port seizures among all 
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344 horizontal and loose criminal networks within the European cocaine market that 
have replaced the traditional hierarchical organisations. The first model has high 
levels of flexibility and adaptability regarding business opportunities and contin-
gencies. It is structured into independent units – connected by key individuals 
(brokers) – with clearly defined roles and duties along the trafficking chain: man-
agers coordinating group activities, persons organising logistics (like recovery 
and purchase of vehicles and equipment) or dealing with the recovery of drugs 
and/or money. Brokers are essential because they are responsible for the charges 
for connecting potential partners, buyers and suppliers, employees and employers 
and they need networking skills specifically adjusted to the cocaine business. 
The Report explains the routes of trafficking operations and sources of capital for 
their financing and settlement of payments including advanced payments, revolv-
ing credits and multistep payment arrangements. Very interesting is the structure 
of the total costs, consisting of transhipment services (€10,000 to set up an import-
export company) and payments to complicit legal entrepreneurs owning import-
export companies at 30% of the value of the load; compensations to drug brokers, 
who earn from 3-4% up to 10% of the value of the load at the EU price; drug cou-
riers are paid per trip with cash or with a percentage on the value of the trans-
ported loads, the prices of which range from €600-€6,000 per kilo transported 
within the EU; drug mules – swallowers that are paid per trip with travel and ac-
commodation expenses covered from €2,000 to €3,000; money counters and col-
lectors receiving €400 to €650 per day; money couriers earning around €1,000 
(salary and expenses) per trip; bribes to officials in the range of from €1,000 to 
€10,000 per container; fees for protection: in order to ensure the security of the 
trafficking operations and the recovery of cocaine in the destination countries and 
other costs and fees in the form of a share of profits of the deal at around 10%. 
Regardless of these costs, organised crime makes huge profits due to significant 
differences in the cocaine purchasing and selling price found in South America 
and EU countries. For instance, the cocaine retail price in the UK is €70,000 per 
kilo but it can be bought for around €2,700 in South America. Profits margins 
depend on several factors – availability of cocaine in an observed market, the re-
tail prices (which differ in various EU markets), the quantity acquired, quality of 
the drug (level of purity), and risks taken/encountered (primarily seizures and ar-
rests). 
A very important factor is access to capital in critical moments because criminal 
entrepreneurs need to ensure the safety of trafficking (fees to competitive organi-
sations, bribes to officials), and need to ensure consistent funding to continue the 
cocaine business. Financial resources are often invested in legal businesses enti-
ties that may serve for money laundering and/or facilitation of criminal activities. 
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345ket seem to be able to continue with their criminal activity without facing any 
particular problems. 
The second section of the book analyses the illegal trade in tobacco products. This 
is a manifestation of organised crime with a long history, one that has only rela-
tively recently acquired academic and law enforcement attention. Four schemes 
characterise the illegal tobacco trade: bootlegging – buying an amount of ciga-
rettes and tobacco that exceeds customs regulations; large-scale smuggling of un-
taxed tobacco products diverted from the licit international market; counterfeiting 
– the manufacturing of fake tobacco products; and selling legally manufactured 
cigarettes which are stolen. According to the available evidence, inflows from 
non-EU countries accounted for the bulk of illegally traded cigarettes in Mediter-
ranean and Eastern border European Union member states. The worst situation is 
in Latvia where almost one third of all tobacco products are illegally traded. In 
Croatia the share mentioned is around 3.7%. 
In the illegal trade in tobacco products the most critical issue is the financing of 
start-up capital. This is because once a smuggling operation is developed it can 
generate sufficient profit to allow further investment in schemes in a number of 
self-financing cycles. There is a wide range of financial sources used to initiate 
tobacco smuggling operations including funds from legitimate work and savings 
and/or funds from legal businesses that belong to, or are managed by, illicit to-
bacco entrepreneurs, but very often there are also a financing consortia. Interest-
ingly, financing the illicit tobacco business from other illegal activities and busi-
nesses, is a rather uncommon source. Costs of the illegal trade in tobacco products 
consist, among other things, of expenditures for transporting and storing the mer-
chandise, payment to actors and other costs for bribes, corruption, political protec-
tion, security and insurance. 
For the readers of our Journal, the most interesting part is section 3 dedicated to 
organised VAT fraud. The EU has worked towards a common VAT anti-fraud 
strategy and recently strengthened anti-fraud measures. Two new directives were 
adopted by the Council in 2013: one introduced a quick reaction mechanism al-
lowing member states to respond immediately to a sudden and massive VAT fraud; 
the other initiated the application of the reverse charge mechanism in relation to 
supplies of certain goods and services susceptible to fraud. Under this directive, 
member states have the possibility to apply this mechanism on a temporary basis 
and for a pre-agreed list of sectors and goods. The reverse charge mechanism re-
quires that the liability for the payment of VAT is shifted from the supplier (as 
normally required by EU rules) to the customer. 
Numbers of goods and services are affected by organised VAT fraud schemes. 
Because of their combination of small size and high price – which makes them 
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346 components have often been used for VAT export frauds. Also used for the same 
purpose are railway vehicle components, scrap and precious metals, metal alloca-
tions and cars. Evasion of VAT is present in many forms, like fictitious exports, 
undervaluation of inputs and overvaluation of outputs to reduce tax liability, false 
classification of goods to take advantage of lower rates, declaration of false quan-
tities and smuggling. One of the major organised crime threats present in EU 
member states is the missing trader intra-community (MTIC) fraud. Other models 
of fraud are acquisition fraud – the missing trader supplies the imported goods at 
the final consumption market and then disappears, embezzling all the due VAT 
debited; carousel fraud – the goods imported by the missing trader are sold 
through a chain of domestic companies (“buffers”) and finally re-exported to an-
other country with zero VAT rate; and fictitious export – a trader realises an export 
transaction on paper, levying zero VAT tax and claiming VAT refund to the tax 
authorities, while at the same time selling the goods on the domestic market with-
out sales invoices. It is almost impossible to assess exactly the overall VAT gap, 
but according to the CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis from 
The Hague, for 2012 for the EU-27 it was estimated at 16% of the overall tax li-
ability. The countries with the largest gap were Romania (44% of theoretical lia-
bility), followed by Slovakia (39%) and Lithuania (36%), while it is relatively low 
in Finland, the Netherlands and Luxembourg where the gap was around 5-6% of 
the VAT due.
The organisers of VAT frauds use different sources to acquire capital for starting 
and running their operations. The required capital comes from both legitimate and 
illegal sources. Professional crooks specialised in swindles, tax and customs duty 
frauds may work as ringleaders. The most common source of capital for initiating 
new VAT fraud schemes is achieved through re-investing the proceeds from previ-
ous fraudulent schemes. It is quite common for a legitimate entrepreneur to invest 
part of his or her legitimate revenues and/or personal savings to initiate a VAT 
fraud scheme. Various cases demonstrate that criminal entrepreneurs invest finan-
cial sources from other criminal activities. Apparently, well-established entrepre-
neurs with legitimate businesses may acquire financing through licit channels 
such as obtaining a bank loan. In Bulgaria, a ringleader of a big VAT fraud ring 
received €23 million in the form of bank guarantees and loans from a Bulgarian 
bank through two companies under his control. In Belgium and Spain actors asked 
for the help of illegal financiers or investors. 
Operational costs usually consist of expenses such as the incorporation of ficti-
tious companies, payments to straw men, proxy men, accountants, supervisors 
and facilitators, corruption fees. Since these costs are relatively low, many law 
enforcement experts believe that a VAT fraud project does not require substantial 
initial investments, while others state that this is true only in part. The profitability 
of VAT fraud depends on a number of factors such as the rate of VAT tax, the type 
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347the number of actors involved. The gross profit is usually equal to the amount of 
the VAT tax embezzled and after the deduction of the business costs there remains 
a significant net profit.
Other parts of this interesting book present case studies of the criminal activities 
mentioned in the observed countries. The current report has provided a different 
perspective on criminal finances and an alternative approach for researching the 
subject. It also suggests possible steps toward the introduction of novel approaches 
to tackle organised crime. Building on the key findings from the study, the authors 
propose a set of recommendations at EU and national levels. Despite the inevi-
table caveats about a very under-researched component of criminal activity, the 
authors believe that their report provides sufficient information and analysis to 
stimulate more academic and practitioner research on these important topics.
